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TAXATION OF ESTATE AND TRUST
INCOME UNDER THE 1954 CODE
George Craven i
The rules for taxing income of estates and trusts are changed in
many respects by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which makes the
first important revision of such rules since the enactment of the Revenue
Act of 1942. The revised rules are set forth in Part I of Subchapter J
of Chapter 1.
With certain minor exceptions, discussed below,' the new provi-
sions are applicable to the calendar year 1954 and to fiscal years be-
ginning after December 31, 1953 and ending after August 16, 1954.2
If an estate or trust made a final distribution of its assets and thus
terminated in 1954 on or before August 16, presumably the 1939 Code
would apply to its final year.
GENERAL STATUTORY PLAN
The general rules are set forth in Subpart A of Part I, comprising
Sections 641 to 643. The 1954 law continues the prior general pattern
of taxing estates and trusts in the same manner as individuals on net
income, now termed taxable income, and the tax is payable by the
fiduciary on such income.3 With certain exceptions,4 an estate or
trust is allowed the same deductions allowed to individuals, and in
addition a deduction is allowed for income required to be distributed
currently or which is distributed currently 5
As in the prior law, the test of the amount of a distribution which
is taxable to beneficiaries is the amount of the additional deduction
allowed to the estate or trust.' Some of the changes incorporated in
the new statute are designed to remove complexities resulting from the
65-day and 12-month rules enacted in 19 4 2,' and to relieve beneficiaries
t A.B., L.L.B., Mercer University; member of Georgia, Florida, New York and
Pennsylvania Bars.
1. See text at note 73 and note 81 infra.
2. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 683 (a). Except where otherwise specified, the
statutory references below are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
3. § 641(b).
4. §§642(b), (c), (i).
5. §§ 651, 661.
6. §§652(a), 662(a).
7. See text at note 69 infra.
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of tax on distributions of amounts which are not part of the taxable
income of the estate or trust.8
The new law preserves the conduit theory of an estate or trust
by providing that various classes of income received by the estate or
trust shall retain their same character of taxable, tax-exempt or par-
tially tax-exempt income in the hands of the beneficiaries. If all
the income is distributable or distributed currently, the beneficiaries
receive the full credit against their tax for foreign taxes, partially tax-
exempt interest, and dividends received; if part of the income is dis-
tributed and part retained by the estate or trust, the credits are ap-
portioned ratably between the fiduciary and the beneficiaries."0
An estate in process of administration will continue to have a per-
sonal exemption of $600, and a trust which may accumulate income
will continue to have an exemption of $100; the exemption of a dis-
tributable trust is increased from $100 to $300, which amount will
be available as a deduction from capital gain, extraordinary dividends
and other taxable income which is properly allocable to corpus." As
under prior law, the 1954 law allows as a deduction any amount of
the gross income, without limitation, which pursuant to the terms of
the will or trust instrument is paid to or set aside for qualified
charitable organizations or purposes."2  However, the 1954 statute
provides that the charitable deduction is to be reduced by an allocable
portion of tax-exempt interest and foreign income.
13
The new statute continues the prior provision that amounts allow-
able as deductions for estate tax purposes as well as for income tax
purposes (not including certain items of deductions in respect of a
decedent which are allowable for both taxes) shall not be allowed as
income tax deductions on the return of an estate unless a waiver is
filed of the right to have such amounts allowed as estate tax deduc-
tions.' 4 The 1954 law, like the prior law, denies the standard deduction
to an estate or trust.'5
If the taxable year of a beneficiary is different from that of an
estate or trust, the amount includible in the gross income of the bene-
ficiary is based on the income of the estate or trust for its taxable
8. See discussion under the heading "Distributions Not Taxable to Beneficiaries
Unless Made from Taxable Income" at p. 609 infra.
9. §652(b), 662(b).
10. §642 (a).
11. §642(b).
12. § 642(c).
13. § 643 (a) (concluding 2 sentences).
14. § 642(g).
15. §§ 642(i), 142(b) (4).
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year ending within or with his taxable year.'0 The prior law had a
similar provision relating to distributable trusts 17 but no such provi-
sion relating to estates or to trusts which may accumulate income.
Deductions on Termination of Estate or Trust
An important new provision in the 1954 Code states that if at
the time of termination an estate or trust has a net operating loss
carryover, a capital loss carryover or deductions for the final year in
excess of gross income (exclusive of the deductions for the personal
exemption and amounts paid to or set aside for charity), such amounts
shall be allowed as deductions to the beneficiaries succeeding to the
property of the estate or trust.' This provision will enable beneficiaries
to take deductions for items such as trustees' commissions and at-
torneys' fees paid from corpus which exceed income of the estate or
trust and which under prior law were not available as deductions. 9
In order to assure the right of the beneficiaries to such deductions, it
seems advisable that there be a complete distribution of all assets of the
estate or trust, so that there can be no question about whether it has
terminated.
20
The use of the words "capital loss carryover," which signify a
loss carried over from one year to another,21 rather than the words
"capital loss," raises the question whether the beneficiaries of a termi-
nated estate or trust may take a deduction for a capital loss in the same
year in which it is sustained by the estate or trust or whether such
loss will be available to the beneficiaries only as a capital loss carry-
over in subsequent years. The report of the Senate Finance Com-
mittee says that this provision makes available to beneficiaries "any
unused capital loss," ' indicating that the word "carryover" was
used inadvertently in the statute. It is to be hoped that this point
will be clarified by the regulations or by a statutory amendment.
16. §§652(c), 662(c).
17. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 164, as amended, 56 STAT. 810 (1942).
18. § 642(h).
19. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A201 (1954) ; SEN. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 343 (1954); McDonald, Dedixtion of Attorneys' Fees
for Federal bcome Tax Purposes, 103 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 168, 202-03 (1954).
20. See SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 340 (1954). On the question
of when a trust is considered terminated, see Craven, Capital Gains and Losses
Affecting Estates and Trusts, 26 Tnm~p. L.Q. 240, 246 (1953) ; Note, Trust Adminis-
tration Upon Terminatio , 32 CHI-KENT REv. 307 (1954).
21. See § 1212.
22. SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 343 (1954).
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LIMITATION ON AMOUNTS TAXABLE TO BENEFICIARIES
A considerable amount of confusion resulted from the use in
the 1939 Code ' of the word "income," rather than "gross income"
or "net income," to describe amounts which were deductible by the
fiduciary and taxable to beneficiaries. The word "income" was con-
strued in some instances to mean income for purposes of fiduciary
accounting under state law.24 The 1954 Code eliminates this problem
by using the term "income" to mean amounts which are income under
the will or trust instrument and local law, and the terms "gross in-
come," "taxable income," "distributable net income" and "undis-
tributed net income" to describe amounts which are taxable under the
income tax statute.2 5
The amount which is properly distributable or distributed to an
income beneficiary is based on income under state law, but the amount
which is deductible by the fiduciary and taxable to the beneficiary is
based on distributable net income as defined in the income tax statute.26
As is shown below, the total amounts taxable to beneficiaries in any
year cannot in any event exceed the distributable net income of the
estate or trust for that year. Taxable income under the 1954 Code 2
substantially corresponds to net income under the 1939 Code.
Definition of Distributable Net Income
Distributable net income is defined in the 1954 statute to mean
the taxable income of the estate or trust computed with the following
modifications: 28
The amount computed as taxable income is increased by the fol-
lowing items:
(1) the deduction for the distributions to beneficiaries, called the
additional deduction;
(2) the personal exemption;
(3) capital losses, except to the extent that such losses are taken
into account in determining the amount of capital gain which is dis-
23. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§162(b),(c), as amended, 56 STAT. 809 (1942).
24. See, e.g., Rogers' Estate v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 695 (2d Cir,), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 780 (1944); Weigel v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1938);
Chambers v. Commissioner, 33 B.T.A. 1125 (1936).
25. § 643 (b).
26. See Sm. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 346-47 (1954).
27. § 63.
28. §643(a).
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tributable or distributed to beneficiaries.29  The deduction for 50% of
the excess of net long-term capital gain over net short-term capital
loss " is not taken into account in computing taxable income for de-
termining distributable net income, thereby increasing the amount of
distributable net income;
(4) tax-exempt interest, reduced by expenses not allowable in
computing taxable income which are allocable to such interest and
by the portion of such interest which is paid or set aside for charitable
purposes;
(5) in the case of a foreign trust,81 amounts of gross income from
foreign sources, reduced by expenses not allowable in computing taxable
income which are allocable to such foreign income and by the portion
of such foreign income which is paid to or set aside for charitable
purposes; 32 and
(6) the amount of the dividend exclusion ($50).
The amount computed as taxable income is decreased by the
following items:
(1) capital gains, to the extent that such gains are allocated to
corpus and are not either (a) paid, credited or required to be dis-
tributed to beneficiaries currently, or (b) paid or set aside for charit-
able purposes; and
(2) in the case of distributable trusts, extraordinary dividends or
taxable stock dividends which the fiduciary, acting in good faith, de-
termines are allocable to corpus under the will or trust instrument and
applicable state law.
The deduction for amounts paid to or set aside for charitable pur-
poses is based on gross income of the estate or trust.' Therefore, this
deduction is taken along with other deductions in arriving at taxable
income, which forms the basis for computing distributable net income.
In determining the amount of the charitable deduction, a proportionate
part of tax-exempt income must be allocated to the charity, and the
deduction is limited to the amount allocated from gross income.34
29. The capital loss may be carried forward under § 1212.
30. See § 1202.
31. Although the Code uses the word "trust," § 643 (a) (6), foreign income is
exempt from tax only if received by a non-resident alien beneficiary. See § 872 (a).
32. Items (4) and (5), which are nontaxable income, are added to taxable in-
come merely for the purpose of allocating various classes of income among the
fiduciary and various beneficiaries. However, they retain their character of non-
taxable income in the hands of the beneficiaries and thus remain free of tax.
33. § 642 (c).
34. § 643 (a) (concluding 2 sentences).
ESTATE AND TRUST INCOME TAXATION
It is important to note that in arriving at distributable net income,
which limits the amount taxable to beneficiaries, the only amounts of
gross income allocated to principal which are excluded are capital gains
and, in the case of distributable trusts (but not in the case of estates
or of trusts which may accumulate income), extraordinary dividends
and taxable stock dividends which in good faith are credited to prin-
cipal. The statute does not permit the exclusion of other undistributed
items of income allocable to principal, such as reserves set aside for
amortization of the cost of improvements to real property where the
amounts set aside exceed the allowable deduction for depreciation, or
amounts, other than capital gains, which had accrued as income to a
decedent at the time of his death and which are includible in income
of the estate. Presumably, those amounts were omitted on practical
grounds.
The report of the Senate Finance Committee points out that since
capital gains are not excluded from distributable net income in cases
where they are paid to a beneficiary during the taxable year, capital
gains which are paid to a beneficiary in the year of termination of a
trust will be taxable to the beneficiary.' This would be equally true
of capital gains paid to a beneficiary of an estate. In view of that
rule, it may be important to determine whether amounts of principal
paid by an executor to legatees, from a commingled bank account
which includes capital gain, include any of such capital gain or whether
the amounts paid are wholly principal other than capital gain. In
the absence of a statutory provision for determining when capital gains
are to be considered distributed, the determination apparently must
be made by entries on the books of the fiduciary3 6 This point should
be clarified by regulations.
The only deductions the amounts of which are added to taxable
income in arriving at distributable net income are those allowed for
distributions; capital losses and the personal exemption. Therefore,
in arriving at distributable net income, taxable income will be computed
by taking other deductions chargeable to principal, such as trustees'
commissions and attorneys' fees allocable to principal, which under
prior law were not allowable in arriving at income taxable to bene-
ficiaries and which were wasted unless there was income chargeable
to corpus from which they might be deducted.17  One odd result of
this rule is that if there are capital gains or extraordinary dividends
which are credited to principal, but which are excluded from distribut-
35. SEN. REP,. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 343-44 (1954).
36. See Garrett v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 848 (1941).
37. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A197 (1954).
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able net income, deductions chargeable to corpus will not be allowable
in reduction of that income but will inure solely to the benefit of
the income beneficiaries, except to the extent that they exceed amounts
of taxable income which are includible in distributable net income. It
would seem more equitable to allow such deductions first from income
credited to principal and to the extent of any excess as deductions in
arriving at distributable net income.
DISTRIBUTABLE TRUSTS
Trusts which are required to distribute all their income currently
are dealt with exclusively in Subpart B of Part I, comprising Sections
651 and 652.88 These trusts are referred to in the report of the House
Ways and Means Committee as "simple trusts," to distinguish them
from "complex trusts," a term used in the Committee report to describe
decedent's estates, trusts which are not required to distribute all their
income currently, trusts which make distributions of principal and
trusts which pay or set aside amounts for charitable purposes. 9
Distributable trusts are taxed generally in the same way as
under prior law. A deduction is allowed to the trust for amounts of
income required to be distributed currently, and those amounts are
taxed to beneficiaries whether distributed or not.40 However, the
amounts deductible by the trust and taxable to the beneficiaries are
limited to the distributable net income of the trust for the taxable
year. The statute states that for the purpose of determining the
amount deductible by the trust, the computation of distributable net
income shall not include items of income which are not included in
the gross income of the trust and deductions allocable thereto.41  This
means that for this purpose, distributable net income is computed with-
out including tax-exempt interest, foreign income in certain cases and
the amount of dividends excluded from gross income. The effect of
this provision is to prevent the trust from obtaining a deduction for
amounts not included in its gross income.
If the amount of income (under state law) to be distributed cur-
rently exceeds the distributable net income of the trust, the amount
38. In any year in which a trustee makes distributions of principal to a remainder-
man, the trust will be treated as a complex trust, § 651 (a). This may not necessarily
include the year in which the income beneficiary dies if no distribution of principal
is made in that year.
39. SFN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 61, 62 (1954). The so-called
complex trusts are governed by Subpart C comprising §§ 661 and 662 which are
discussed under the heading "Estates and Other Trusts" at p. 611 infra. The
terms "simple trusts" and "complex trusts" are not used in the statute or in the
report of the Senate Finance Committee.
40. §§ 651, 652.
41. § 651(b).
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included in the gross income of each beneficiary is an amount which
bears the same ratio to distributable net income as the amount of in-
come (under state law) distributable to such beneficiary bears to the
total distributable income (under state law) of the trust.42
Distributions Not Taxable to Beneficiaries
Unless Made from Taxable Income
A result of the provision limiting the amount taxable to bene-
ficiaries to the distributable net income of the trust is that amounts
distributed as income under state law which are not part of the gross
income of the trust will not be taxed as income to beneficiaries. This
provision nullifies the rules of Johnston v. Helvering ' and McCul-
lough v. Commissioner," which dealt with distributions of amounts
considered income under state law which were not part of the gross
income of the trust. In the Johnston case, a trustee foreclosed a
mortgage on real estate and in a later year sold the property at a
loss and, under the applicable rule of state law," allocated part of the
proceeds of sale to the income beneficiaries. It was held that since the
amounts received by the beneficiaries were income under state law, they
were includible in gross income of the beneficiaries for income tax pur-
poses. In the McCullough case, a trustee received a non-taxable stock
dividend of common-on-common and allocated a part of the dividend
shares to the income beneficiary under state law. It was held that
the dividend stock reached the income beneficiary as taxable income and
that his basis was the fair market value of the stock at the time of dis-
tribution and not merely a proportionate part of the trustee's basis for
the original stock.
This new rule, limiting amounts taxable to beneficiaries to dis-
tributable net income of the trust for the taxable year, is equally ap-
plicable to estates and to trusts which may accumulate income.'
Character of Amounts of Income:
Allocation of Deductions
Items of income of various classes which are included in dis-
tributable net income will preserve their same character in the hands
42. § 652 (a).
43. 141 F.2d 208 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 715 (1944).
44. 153 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1946).
45. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A197 (1954); SEN. RFP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 346-47 (1954).
46. See, e.g., Nirdlinger's Estate, 327 Pa. 171, 193 AtI. 30 (1937).
47. § 662(a).
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of beneficiaries. The statute provides that unless the trust instrument
specifically allocates different classes of income to different benefici-
aries, amounts distributed to beneficiaries will be treated as consisting
of a ratable part of each class of income entering into the computation
of distributable net income,48 so that each beneficiary will exclude from
gross income his ratable share of tax-exempt income and will take
credit for an allocable portion of dividends received, partially taxable
income and foreign taxes. It is implicit in the statute that it is per-
missible to provide in the will or other trust instrument that certain
beneficiaries shall receive fully taxable income and that others shall
receive partially taxable, tax-exempt or foreign income.
The statute provides further that in applying the rule which ap-
portions various items of income among beneficiaries, the items of
deduction entering into the computation of distributable net income
shall be allocated among the items of distributable net income in ac-
cordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury
or his delegate.4 There is a similar provision in the statute relating
to estates and to trusts which may accumulate income."u The meaning
of this provision is not clear. With the exception of the requirement
that nonbusiness expenses be allocated between taxable and non-taxable
income,"- there was no requirement in the prior law that various items
of deductions of an estate or trust be allocated among various classes
of income. Under prior law, as in the case of individuals, expenses of
an estate or trust were charged first against income which enjoyed no
tax privilege, such as fully taxable interest, and only the excess de-
ductions served to reduce income having tax privileges, such as par-
tially taxable interest. The new statute appears to empower the
Treasury Department to prescribe by regulations that the prior rule
shall continue in force and that for this purpose an estate or trust
shall be treated in the same way as an individual.
If the Treasury Department should issue regulations requiring
that each item of deduction be allocated among various classes of in-
come of an estate or trust, the resulting burden to corporate fiduciaries
would be very great, without producing any substantial amount of
revenue. It has been estimated by representatives of Philadelphia
trust companies that if such requirement is made, the time consumed
in preparing fiduciary returns will be more than doubled. It is to be
48. § 652(b).
49. Ibid.
50. § 662 (b).
51. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§23(a) (2), 24(a) (5), as amended, 56 STAT. 819
(1942).
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hoped that no such regulation will be issued 5 and that if such regula-
tion is issued, Congress will come promptly to the rescue of fiduciaries
by amending the statute so as to make it clear that no such allocation
is required.
ESTATES AND OTHER TRUSTS
The provisions relating to decedents' estates and to trusts which
may accumulate income, pay amounts from principal or set aside in-
come for charitable purposes are found in Subpart C of Part I, com-
prising Sections 661 to 663. They follow in general the rules relating
to distributable trusts. Amounts which are taxable to beneficiaries
are limited to the distributable net income of the estate or trust,5 which
is the same as in the case of a distributable trust except that ex-
traordinary dividends and taxable stock dividends are included in in-
come." If part of the distributable net income is distributed to bene-
ficiaries and part retained by the estate, various classes of income are
allocated ratably to the estate and beneficiaries."'
In determining the distributable net income allocable to bene-
ficiaries, the beneficiaries are divided into two groups or tiers, and an
order of priority is established. The distributable net income is first
reduced by amounts of income required to be distributed currently,
including amounts required to be distributed currently which may be
paid from income or corpus but which in fact are paid from income
for the taxable year.58 The beneficiaries of the required current dis-
tributions constitute the first tier, and the amounts of the required
current distributions are allocated among and included in the income
of those beneficiaries in the same way as income of a fully distributable
trust1' The second tier of beneficiaries consists of those to whom
any other amounts are paid, credited or to be distributed during the
taxable year. The amounts taxable to beneficiaries in this tier are
limited to distributable net income of the estate or trust reduced by the
distributable net income payable to those in the first tier, and are al-
located in the same way as in the case of distributable trusts.15 There-
fore, if the total amounts distributable to beneficiaries of the first tier
52. The instruction sheet for the fiduciary return, Form 1041, does not require
such allocation, and the writer understands that no such requirement will be made
in the regulations.
53. § 662(a).
54. § 643 (a) (4).
55. §661(b).
56. §661(a) (1).
57. §662(a) (1).
58. §6 62(a) (2).
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exceed the distributable net income for the taxable year, second tier
beneficiaries are not taxed on current income.5 9
In computing distributable net income for the purpose of allocat-
ing various classes of income to beneficiaries in the first tier, the deduc-
tion for amounts of gross income paid to or set aside for charitable
purposes is allowed only to the extent that such amounts are paid or
set aside from income of the estate or trust for the taxable year. ° For
example, assume that the trust instrument provides that one-half of
the income shall be distributed each year to A, that in the trustee's
discretion all or any part of the balance may be accumulated or dis-
tributed to B or to designated charitable organizations and that income
accumulated in one year may be distributed in a subsequent year to
B or to the designated charitable organizations; assume further that
the trust for the taxable year has $10,000 of taxable interest, $8,000
of dividends for which the 4% credit is allowable and $5,000 of tax-
exempt interest, and that the trustee distributes $11,500 to A and
$20,000 to charity X (consisting of $11,500 of current income and
$8,500 of income accumulated in a prior year). The charitable de-
duction will be $11,500, and not the $20,000 actually distributed to
the charity; A will be deemed to receive $5,000 of taxable interest,
$4,000 of dividends for which the 4% credit is allowable and $2,500
of tax-exempt interest.
Beneficiaries who fall into the second tier include those entitled to
receive annuities or other amounts payable out of principal. The stat-
ute treats as income distributions, subject to the distributable net in-
come limitation, all amounts paid or to be distributed from either in-
come or principal except lump sum gifts or bequests which meet the
tests described below." The 1954 Code thus continues the provisions
of the prior law, 2 enacted in 1942, designed to change the rule of
Burnzet v. Whitehouse, which held that annual payments which might
be satisfied from principal were exempt from tax to beneficiaries as
gifts or bequests, even though paid wholly from income.
If the trust instrument should provide for accumulation of income
and the payment of annual amounts from principal to individual bene-
ficiaries, the annual payments would be treated as income to the bene-
ficiaries in an amount not in excess of the distributable net income of
59. Ibid.
60. §662(b). See SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 350 (1954).
61. f§ 662(a) (2), 663. See text following note 64 infra.
62. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 162(d), added by 56 STAT. 809 (1942), as amended,
58 STAT. 50 (1944).
63. 283 U.S. 148 (1931).
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the trust. On the other hand, if trust income is accumulated for the
benefit of individuals and annual payments are made from principal to
charitable organizations, the income each year will be taxed to the
trust, subject to the application of the five-year throwback."
Lump Sum Bequests Not Taxed as Income.
Treatment of Residuary Bequests
The 1954 statute excepts from amounts which are treated as in-
come distributions an amount properly paid or credited under the
governing instrument as a "gift or bequest of a specific sum of money
or of specific property" which (1) is paid all at once or in not more
than three installments and (2) cannot be paid or credited wholly from
income.' An amount paid on account of a specific bequest or devise 66
is taxable as income to the legatee or devisee if it is paid in more than
three installments or if the will specifies that it is to be paid from
income.
8 7
However, through what may have been an oversight in drafting
the statute, this exception does not extend to an amount paid in satis-
faction of a general or residuary bequest or devise, or an amount of
principal distributed under the intestacy laws. The failure to provide
an exception for distributions of such amounts of principal means that
if the statute is construed literally, any principal distribution of an
estate, other than amounts paid on account of a specific bequest or de-
vise, will be treated as a distribution of income. This will undoubtedly
result in serious complications in the administration of an estate and in
many instances will produce unintended and inequitable results.
For example, suppose that a testator leaves a residuary estate of
$200,000, of which one-half is left outright to A and one-half is left
in trust to pay the income to B for life; that the distributable net in-
come of the estate for the taxable year is $10,000; that one-half of such
income is paid to A and one-half is paid to the trust and thus becomes
distributable to B; and that a principal distribution of $40,000 is made
to A. The total distributions which will be considered distributions of
income amount to $50,000, of which A receives $45,000 or 9/10 and
B receives $5,000 or 1/10. A will be taxable on 9/10 of the distribut-
able net income or $9,000, and B will be taxable on only 1/10 or
$1,000.8 If, on the other hand, the income is distributed in the same
64. See discussion under the heading "Five-Year Throwback" at p. 616 infra.
65. § 663 (a).
66. Although the statutory language does not include the word "devise," the word
"gift" should be broad enough to include devises.
67. See SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 353-54 (1954).
68. § 662 (a) (2).
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way but the $40,000 of principal is paid to the trust for B rather than
to A, the trust will be deemed to receive $9,000 of income and A $1,000,
and of the $9,000, presumably $5,000 will be considered distributable
and taxable to B and the remaining $4,000 will be taxable to the trust.
Many other examples could be given of curious and probably un-
intended results which are brought about by this statutory quirk.
There is a serious question about the constitutionality of an income
tax statute which taxes to a beneficiary receiving principal an amount of
income in excess of an amount which may inure to his benefit. This
provision requires prompt remedial action by Congress in order to
eliminate any requirement that amounts of principal distributed by an
estate in process of administration shall be treated as distributions of
income.
65-Day and 12-Month Rules Abolished
With the exceptions discussed below, the statute relating to es-
tates and to trusts which may accumulate income abolishes the 65-day
and 12-month rules of the prior statute, 9 enacted in 1942 to provide
for taxing to beneficiaries amounts received by an estate or trust in
one year and distributed to beneficiaries in another. Prior to the 1942
act, such amounts were held taxable to the estate or trust in the year
of receipt and exempt from tax to the beneficiaries in the year of dis-
tribution." The 65-day rule provided that if within the first 65 days
of a taxable year income of an estate or trust for a prior period be-
came payable, such income (to the extent not in excess of the income
of the estate or trust for the last 12 months of the prior period) should
be deemed distributed on the last day of the preceding year. The 12-
month rule provided that if on a date more than 65 days after the be-
ginning of the taxable year income of an estate or trust became payable,
such income should be considered a distribution of income of the tax-
able year to the extent of the income of the estate or trust for the last
12 months of the period in which the income was received by the estate
or trust. The new statute provides in substance that a distribution
shall be deemed a distribution of current income to the extent of dis-
tributable net income of the estate or trust for the taxable year.7
Therefore, it is immaterial whether a distribution is made from cur-
rent or prior year's income and how much income is on hand when
the distribution is made.
69. Int Rev. Code of 1939, § 162(d).
70. See Graham v. Miller, 137 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1943) ; Commissioner v. Dean,
102 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1939); G.C.M. 21799, 1940-1 Cum. BuL. 159.
71. § 662(a).
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For example, assume that the distributable net income of an es-
tate in process of administration is $10,000 for 1954 and $10,000 for
1955, and that the estate makes no income distribution in 1954 but
distributes $10,000 of income on January 2, 1955. The distribution
will be considered a distribution of 1955 income and will be taxed to
the beneficiaries as such. However, if the distributable net income of
the estate for 1955 should be only $8,000, only that amount of income
would be taxed as income to the beneficiaries.
As has been pointed out, the provisions of the 1954 Code apply
to taxable years of estates or trusts beginning after December 31, 1953
and ending after August 16, 1954.72 However, the 1954 law pre-
serves the 65-day rule of the 1939 Code in the case of distributions,
made during the first 65 days of the first taxable year governed by the
new law, which under the prior law would be deemed made on the last
day of the preceding year.73 Therefore, such distributions will be de-
ductible by the estate or trust and taxable to the beneficiaries as income
of the prior year.
The new statute preserves the 65-day rule for trusts which meet
certain requirements, but not for estates. It provides that an amount
paid by a trust within the first 65 days of its taxable year shall be con-
sidered paid on the last day of the preceding year if (1) the trust was
in existence prior to January 1, 1954, (2) under the terms of the trust
instrument the trust may not distribute in any taxable year amounts in
excess of its income for the preceding year, and (3) the fiduciary makes
an election under the statute and regulations to have such rule apply.
If the fiduciary makes such an election with respect to any taxable year,
the rule is applicable to amounts paid within the first 65 days of all
subsequent years. 74
It will no longer be possible for an executor to make distributions
in the first 65 days of the succeeding year and have them treated as cur-
rent distributions. The distributions, in order to be deductible by the
estate and taxable to the beneficiaries, must be made by the end of the
taxable year of the estate. Conversely, by withholding a distribution
until the year has ended, the executor will prevent it from being taxed
currently to a beneficiary, although it may be taxed to the beneficiary
72. §683 (a).
73. § 683(b).
74. § 663(b). The writer believes that the only effect of the exercise of such
election would be to tax to beneficiaries and not to the trust the income of a trust
for the calendar year 1954 (or a fiscal year beginning in 1954 and ending after
August 16, 1954) which was not distributed in that year but was distributed in the
first 65 days of the following year. If the election were not exercised, the income
for 1954 would be taxed to the trust, but in 1955 and subsequent years, when income
of a prior year is distributed, it would be treated as a distribution of income in the
year of distribution.
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as income for the year of distribution. This will likewise be true of
trusts other than those which meet the requirements stated in the pre-
ceding paragraph.
Separate Shares Treated as Separate Trusts
The new statute provides that for the sole purpose of determining
the amount of distributable net income which is taxable to a beneficiary
under the rules relating to so-called complex trusts, if a single trust has
more than one beneficiary, substantially separate and independent
shares of different beneficiaries are to be treated as separate trusts.
This rule is to be applied under tests prescribed by the regulations. 5
The report of the Senate Finance Committee states that the effect of
this provision is to prevent a beneficiary from being taxed on a distribu-
tion which is made from corpus but whichwould, except for this pro-
vision, be treated as a taxable distribution because trust income is being
accumulated for another beneficiary.76 The division of the trust into
separate shares or trusts will prevent the beneficiary receiving corpus
from being taxed on an amount in excess of the distributable net in-
come of the trust of his share.
Unfortunately, the separate share rule applies only to trusts and
not to estates. One solution of the problem resulting from treating dis-
tributions of non-specific principal of an estate as distributions of in-
come 77 would be to extend the separate share rule to an estate. If
this were done, a beneficiary receiving a distribution of principal would
not be taxable on income in excess of the income from his share of the
estate.
FIVE-YEAR THROWBACK
The 1954 statute in Subpart D of Part I, comprising Sections 665
to 668, makes a complete innovation by enacting a five-year throwback
rule for taxing to beneficiaries distributions of trust income which ex-
ceed the distributable net income of the trust for the taxable year.
Those provisions are based in part on a statutory draft prepared by the
American Law Institute, although that draft limits the period of the
throwback to two years.78 The purpose of the new rule is to prevent
the use of income accumulations in a trust to obtain the benefit of tax
rates lower than those which would be applicable if the income were
75. § 663(c).
76. SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 355 (1954).
77. See text following note 67 supra.
78. ALI Fed. Income Tax Stat. §X841 (Feb. 1954 Draft).
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received each year by beneficiaries.79 It is aimed primarily at the crea-
tion of multiple trusts with income accumulations for substantially the
same beneficiaries.
The throwback rule is not applicable to an estate in process of ad-
ministration and is not applicable to the following amounts of trust
income: so
(1) amounts paid or distributable to a beneficiary as income
accumulated before his birth or during his minority;
(2) amounts paid to a beneficiary to meet his emergency
needs;
(3) amounts paid to a beneficiary at a specified age if (a)
the total number of such distributions to him cannot exceed four,
(b) there is a period of at least four years between each such dis-
tribution, and (c) on January 1, 1954 such distributions were
required by the specific terms of the governing instrument; and
(4) amounts paid to a beneficiary as a final distribution of
the trust if the distribution is made more than nine years after the
date of the last transfer to the trust.
The throwback rule applies to income accumulated in taxable years
beginning after December 31, 1953.81 It has no application to trust ac-
cumulations under the laws of states, such as New York, where income
may be accumulated for an individual only during minority. How- -
ever, it would apply in Pennsylvania to trust income accumulated dur-
ing the life of the grantor and beyond the minority of a beneficiary.
Likewise, it would apply to accumulations governed by the law of a
state having the common law rule against accumulations if the ac-
cumulation is not for the benefit of a minor or unborn persons and does
not fall within any of the other exceptions specified above.
The distributions to which the throwback rule applies are distribu-
tions made during the taxable year of amounts which are treated -as
income distributions under the rules relating to complex trusts. The
rule comes into play in any year in which those distributions exceed by
more than $2,000 the distributable net income of a trust for that year
reduced by income distributions which are required to be made cur-
rently.
s2
Where the excess distributions amount to more than $2,000, the
entire amount of the excess is thrown back in inverse order to the five
79. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1954).
80. § 665(b).
81. §666(a). It does not apply to distributions after that date of income ac-
cumulated prior to that date.
82. § 665(h).
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taxable years preceding the year of distribution and is treated succes-
sively as a distribution on the last day of each of those years to the ex-
tent that such amount exceeds the total undistributed net income for
any taxable years intervening between the year of actual distribution
and the preceding year to which the excess is thrown back.88 Whether
or not there is any undistributed net income for any one or more of the
five preceding years to which the excess distributions are thrown back,
such excess distributions cannot in any event be deemed made for any
year more than five years prior to the year of the actual distribution.
Undistributed net income of a trust for any year is defined to mean the
amount by which the distributable net income for that year exceeds (1)
the deduction for that year for income distributions and (2) the income
tax of the trust for that year.84
If the amount thrown back to any preceding year is equal to the
entire amount of undistributed net income of the trust for such year,
the beneficiary is given credit for the tax paid by the trust on such
undistributed net income; if the amount thrown back is less than the
total undistributed net income of the trust for the preceding year, the
beneficiary is given credit for a ratable portion of the tax paid by the
trust on undistributed net income. The amount of the tax so credited
to the beneficiary is in turn treated as an additional income distribution
to the beneficiary for the year for which the tax was paid.'
For example, suppose that a trust accumulates in each of the years
1954 to 1959, inclusive, $4,000 of taxable income and that it pays $800
in income tax each year, leaving undistributed net income of $3,200
each year for the six-year period. Assume further that in 1960, in
addition to distributing all its distributable net income for that year,
it distributes to a beneficiary the total accumulated income of $19,200.
Income of $3,200 will be deemed distributed to the beneficiary on the
last day of each of the years 1955 to 1959, inclusive, a total of $16,000.
In addition, the total taxes of $4,000 paid by the trust on undistributed
net income for such five years will be deemed distributed in equal
amounts in such years and will be included in the beneficiary's income,
making total income distributions of $20,000, and the beneficiary will
be given credit for such taxes. Since the accumulation in 1954 extends
beyond the five-year period, it will be disregarded. The rule is more
complicated where only a part of the income of the trust for a prior
year is deemed distributed to the beneficiary."
83. §666(a).
84. §665 (a).
85. §§668(b), 666(b), (c).
86. It is provided in §668(c) that if only a portion of the undistributed net
income of the trust for prior year is deemed distributed to the beneficiary in the
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Method of Taxing Excess Distributions
The total of the amount deemed distributed to the beneficiary in
prior years is included in the income of the beneficiary for the year in
which the distribution is actually made to him. The income is included
in the income of the beneficiary to the same extent that such income
would have been includible if distributed on the last day of the year of
accumulation.87 The various items of accumulated income thus retain
the same character in the hands of the beneficiary which they had to
the trust. However, the amount of tax payable by the beneficiary on
such income for the year of distribution cannot be greater than the
tax which would have been payable by him if the distributions had
been made to him in the respective preceding years in which they are
deemed made.8  This limitation will require a computation similar to
that required in the case of compensation from employment covering a
period of more than 36 months 8 9 to determine whether the beneficiary's
tax as so computed is less than the tax computed by including the entire
amount of the excess distributions in his income in the year in which
actually received.
It will no doubt be found in many instances, where the beneficiary
had little or no income in the five-year period during which the income
was accumulated, that the beneficiary's tax on the accumulated income
is less than that of the trust. However, the application of the throwback
rule cannot in any event result in a tax saving, as the statute expressly
denies a refund of tax paid by the trust on accumulated income. 90
Avoidance of Throwback Rule
The application of the throwback rule may be avoided in a state
having the common-law rule against accumulations by providing that
after the accumulation period the trust income shall be distributed each
year for five years and that the accumulated income shall be distributed
at the end of the five-year period. This plan may be followed also in
Pennsylvania where the accumulation period of an inter vivos trust is
prior year, the beneficiary's income shall be increased by a pro rata portion of the
income tax paid by the trust on the prior year's undistributed net income. However,
§668(b) provides that the beneficiary shall receive credit against his tax for the
portion of the tax which would not have been payable by the trust for the prior year
if the amount deemed distributed to the beneficiary in such year had in fact been dis-
tributed. This will result in the beneficiary's receiving credit for tax of the trust
in excess of the amount of tax which is included in his income. See Kamin, Surrey
& Warren, The Interua Revenue Code of 1954: Trusts, Estates and Beneficiaries,
54 CoL. L. REv. 1237, 1252 (1954).
87. § 668(a).
88. Ibid.
89. § 1301.
90. See § 667.
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measured by the life of the grantor. Since the trust would have no un-
distributed net income during any of the five years preceding the year
of distribution, none of the accumulated income in excess of the trust
income for the year of distribution would be taxable to the beneficiaries.
Also, the application of the throwback rule may be avoided by
providing for distribution of the accumulated income at the time of
termination of the trust, as a final distribution, more than nine years
after the creation of the trust. 1 The throwback rule will be avoided
in such case only if no additional transfers are made to the trust within
nine years of its termination. However, as will be seen in the discus-
sion of the statute taxing the grantor as substantial owner of trust in-
come, 2 if the principal of the trust fund is to revert to the grantor on
termination, the trust must be created for a period of at least ten years
to prevent the income from being taxed to the grantor.
Criticism of Throwback Rule
It is claimed by Treasury representatives that the throwback rule
is necessary in order to prevent tax avoidance through the accumula-
tion of income. No estimate has been published of the amount of rev-
enue which these statutory provisions are designed to produce, and it
may be that it is impossible to make such an estimate. In the absence
of this rule, the accumulated income would be taxed each year to the
trust, with an exemption of $100; it is difficult to believe that the loss
of revenue through income accumulations in trusts is sufficiently great
to justify encumbering the income tax law with such intricate provi-
sions.
The burden of attempting to apply the rule, like other burdens im-
posed by the 1954 statute, falls on the fiduciary and not on the bene-
ficiaries. If a trust has various classes of income during a five-year
period, some of which is distributed and some accumulated, it will in-
volve a great amount of the fiduciary's time to ascertain, for each bene-
ficiary to whom accumulated income is distributed, how much of each
class of income and how much of the tax paid by the fiduciary in each
of the five years is allocable to that beneficiary's share of accumulated
income. The complications surrounding the application of the rule and
the computation of the tax of the beneficiary cause one to wonder
whether the cure is not worse than the disease. The throwback rule
seems especially out of place in a statute designed to simplify the in-
come tax laws.
91. § 665 (b) (4).
92. See text at and following note 100 infra.
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It is to be hoped that after further consideration, Congress will
decide that the throwback rule has no place in the income tax statute
and should be repealed. However, if it is decided to retain this rule,
the burden which it imposes would be softened by limiting its aplica-
tion to income accumulated during a period of two years prior to the
year of distribution, as was proposed in the American Law Institute
draft.
GRANTORS AND OTHERS TREATED AS SUBSTANTIAL OWNERS
The provisions of the 1954 Code taxing to grantors and others as
substantial owners trust income not received by them are found in
Subpart E of Part I of Subchapter J, comprising Sections 671 to 678.
They include new statutory provisions taxing trust income to the
grantor under the principle of substantial ownership, a reenactment,
with certain changes, of provisions of the prior law taxing trust income
to the grantor because of a power to revoke or because trust income is
or may be held or applied for the grantor's benefit, and new statutory
provisions taxing trust income to a person other than the grantor be-
cause of a power to receive principal or income.
The 1954 statute states that no trust income may be taxed to the
grantor or any other person solely on the grounds of dominion and
control under any provision of the income taxe statute other than this
subpart.0
Grantor Treated as Substantial Owner
The rules for taxing income to the grantor under the principle of
substantial ownership stem from the decision in Helvering v. Clifford,4
where the taxpayer created a trust for the benefit of his wife with him-
self as trustee for a period of five years, at the end of which period the
trust corpus was to revert to the grantor. Although there was no pro-
vision of the statute taxing the trust income to the grantor, it was held
that the grantor retained such dominion and control over the property
during the short trust term that he was in substance the owner of the
trust property for income tax purposes, and the income was taxable to
him under the statutory definition of gross income.95
There was a vast amount of litigation resulting from efforts to
apply the rule of the Clifford case to varying incidents of ownership
over trust property and income. Regulations which have been in force
93. § 671. See SEN. RE,. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 365 (1954).
94. 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
95. Revenue Act of 1934, §22(a), 48 STAT. 686 (1934).
1955]
622 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103
under the prior statute since 1946 9 set forth detailed rules for deter-
mining when the grantor of a trust is to be regarded as substantial
owner of the trust property or income. Certain provisions of the regu-
lations were held invalid in a decision which indicated doubt about the
right of the Treasury Department to deal fully with this problem by
regulations.'
The 1954 Code embodies in the statute, with certain changes, the
rules formerly prescribed by regulations " along with the prior statu-
tory provisions taxing trust income to the grantor because of a power
to revoke or because trust income is. or may be applied or held for the
grantor's benefit. 9 The statute prescribes five general tests for de-
termining whether trust income paid to or accumulated for others is
taxable to the grantor; if any one of these tests is met, the grantor is
deemed the owner and the income is taxable to him regardless of,
whether any one or more of the other tests is satisfied."°
The statutory rules imposing these five tests are discussed below.
(1) Reversionary Interest.-The grantor is treated as the owner
of any portion of a trust of which he has a reversionary interest in
either the corpus or the income if the interest may reasonably be ex-
pected to take effect in possession or enjoyment within ten years from
the transfer in trust of that portion or within an extension period of
less than ten years.' 0 '
There is an exception to the ten-year rule which did not appear in
the prior regulations. Trust income will not be taxable to the grantor
to the extent that it is payable irrevocably for at least two years to a
church or association or convention of churches, an educational organ-
ization or a hospital which qualifies for the exemption under the in-
come tax laws.'02 However, the report of the Senate Finance Com-
mittee '03 sounds a warning note that this exception will not apply un-
less the income for the entire trust term must be paid to the "single
96. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.22(a)-21 (1953); U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-
21 (1943), as amended by T.D. 5488, 1946-1 Cum. BuLL. 19, and T.D. 5567, 1947-2
CuM. BuLL. 9.
97. Commissioner v. Clark, 202 F.2d 94 (7th Cir. 1953).
98. §§ 671-675. See SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 366 (1954).
99. f§ 676, 677. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 166, 53 STAT. 68 (1939); Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, § 167, as amended, 58 STAT. 51 (1944).
100. § 671.
101. § 673(a).
102. § 673(b). In Commissioner v. Clark, 202 F2d 94 (7th Cir. 1953), it was
held that the ten-year provision of the prior regulations was invalid and trust income
was not taxable to the grantor where the trust was created prior to the issuance
of the regulations and the income was payable for less than ten years to a nonprofit
organization.
103. SFN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 366 (1954).
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specified beneficiary" and that it will not apply if the trustee has discre-
tion to pay income to any one or more of several named charitable
organizations.
As in the prior regulations, trust income will not be taxable to
the grantor if it is payable to another person for life, even though such
other person has a life expectancy of less than ten years.' ° However,
the Revenue Service ruled recently that trust income is taxable to the
grantor where he has a reversionary interest in the corpus which will
revert to his estate at death, if his life expectancy is less than ten
years. 05
(2) Power to Control Beneficial Enjoyment.-The general rule,
as under the prior regulations, is that the grantor will be treated as the
owner of a trust to the extent that the beneficial enjoyment of the cor-
pus or income is subject to a power of disposition, exercisable by the
grantor or a nonadverse party, or both, without the consent of an ad-
verse party.10 As in the prior regulations, the statute enumerates a
number of powers which are exceptions to the general rule and the ex-
istence of which will not result in taxing the income to the grantor.
10 7
One of these exceptions introduces a new concept into the income
tax statute. It provides that trust income shall not be taxable to the
grantor because of the existence of a power to distribute, apportion or
accumulate income or to pay out corpus to or for beneficiaries or a class
of beneficiaries, if the power is exercisable solely by a trustee or trus-
tees, none of whom is the grantor and not more than half of whom are
"related or subordinate parties who are subservient to the wishes of the
grantor." 108
The statute states that the term "related or subordinate party"
means any nonadverse party who is the grantor's spouse living with
the grantor; the grantor's father, mother, issue, brother or sister; an
employee of the grantor; a corporation or any employee of a corpora-
tion in which the stock holdings of the grantor and the trust are signifi-
cant from the viewpoint of voting control; or a subordinate employee
of a corporation in which the grantor is an executive.' A related or
subordinate party "shall be presumed to be subservient to the grantor"
with respect to powers conferred on him "unless such party is shown
not to be subservient by a preponderance of the evidence." '0
104. § 673 (c).
105. Rev. Rul. 55-34, 1955-4 INT. REv. BuLL. 9.
106. §674(a).
107. §674(b),(c),(d).
108. §674 (c).
109. §672(c).
110. Ibid.
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This is indeed an odd and puzzling provision. If a person such as
the grantor's spouse, child or employee, who otherwise would be related
or subordinate, has a beneficial and consequently an adverse interest
in the trust, such person will not be considered related or subordinate.
However, if such person has no adverse interest and consequently is a
related or subordinate party, it must be determined further whether
such person is also subservient to the grantor, and the burden is on the
grantor to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that such per-
son is not subservient.
What rules are to be applied in determining whether a husband or
wife is subservient to the other? Is the determination to be made on
the basis of physical prowess, dominating nature or size of pocketbook?
The requirement that such trustees be subservient as well as related,
in order to prevent the exception to the general rule from applying, was
designed to make the exception more lenient to the grantor than would
be true if the exception were made inapplicable merely because such
trustees were related to the grantor."' However, the difficulty of es-
tablishing by a preponderance of the evidence whether or not a related
person is subservient to the grantor makes the provision of doubtful
practical benefit.
(3) Administrative Powers Exercisable for the Grantor's Bene-
fit.-The grantor is treated as the owner of a portion of the trust and
is taxable on the income under this rule to the extent that powers may
be exercised for the grantor's benefit by permitting him to deal with
trust assets or borrow trust funds and to the extent that a power of ad,
ministration is exercisable in a nonfiduciary capacity by any person
without the approval of a person in a fiduciary capacity." The statute
is violated and the income is taxed to the grantor to the extent that a
person in a nonfiduciary capacity has a power (1) to vote or direct
the voting of stock of a corporation in which the holdings of the
grantor and the trust are significant from the viewpoint of voting con-
trol, or (2) to direct or veto investments to the extent that the trust
funds consist of such stock, or (3) to the extent that there is a power
to reacquire trust corpus by substituting other property.
The provisions relating to a power to vote stocks or direct invest-
ments are far from clear. If the grantor names himself trustee and re-
serves no express power to benefit himself through the voting of stocks
or the investing of trust funds, his power to vote stocks or direct in-
vestments is necessarily exercisable in the interests of the trust bene-
111. See SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 369 (1954).
112. §675.
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ficiaries and in a fiduciary capacity. Likewise, if the grantor is not
named as trustee but reserves the power to vote stocks or direct invest-
ments, without reserving the right to exercise the power for his own
benefit, the power will be exercisable by him in a fiduciary capacity.
However, it may be that the statute intends to imply that if the trust
assets include stocks of corporations in which the holdings of the
grantor and the trust are significant from the viewpoint of voting con-
trol, the mere right of the grantor to vote the stocks or direct invest-
ments, whether or not as a trustee, is to be considered an administra-
tive power exercisable in a nonfiduciary capacity. This provision of
the statute requires clarification by the regulations.
(4) Power to Revoke.-The new Code continues the provisions
of the prior statute 118 treating the grantor as the owner of trust corpus
and taxing him on the income to the extent that a power to revest in
the grantor title to the trust fund is exercisable by the grantor or a non-
adverse party or both.114  However, the new statute adds a provision
that the grantor shall not be taxable on such income under this pro-
vision to the extent that the exercise of the power cannot affect the
beneficial enjoyment of the income within ten years after the creation
of the trust or an extension period, within the rule mentioned above
relating to reversionary interests."15
(5) Income for the Benefit of the Grantor.-The new Code like-
wise continues the provisions of the prior statute "16 that the grantor is
taxable on trust income which is, or, in the discretion of the grantor
or a nonadverse party or both, may be (1), distributed to the grantor;
(2) held or accumulated for future distribution to,the grantor or (3)
applied to the payment of premiums on policies of insurance on the
life of the grantor other than policies payable irrevocably for charitable
purposes." 7 In keeping with other provisions taxing the grantor as
owner, the new statute states that this provision shall not apply to a
power to the extent that its exercise cannot affect the beneficial enjoy-
ment within ten years after the transfer in trust or an extension
period.""
The 1954 statute continues the prior provision 119 that, income shall
not be taxable to the grantor under this rule merely because such in-
113. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §166, 53 STAT. 68 (1938).
114. § 676(a).
115. §676(b).
116. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 167, as amended, 58 STAT. 51 (1944).
117. § 677(a).
118. Ibid.
119. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 167(c), added by 58 STAT. 51 (1944).
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come in the discretion of another person, the trustee, or the grantor act-
ing as trustee or co-trustee, may be applied or distributed for the sup-
port of a legal dependent of the grantor, except to the extent that the
income is actually applied or distributed for such purpose. 20 As in
the prior statute, there is no provision relieving the grantor of tax on
income where corpus may be applied for the support of a legal dependent
and thus used for the grantor's benefit. The new statute provides,
however, that where amounts are applied for the support of a legal
dependent of the grantor from corpus or from income other than that
for the taxable year, such amounts shall be deemed to be amounts paid
or credited to the grantor and shall be taxed to him as a beneficiary of
a second tier distribution.' 2 '
Person Other Than Grantor Treated as Substantial Owner
The rules taxing trust income to someone other than the grantor
who does not receive the income, on the ground that he is to be con-
sidered the owner of the trust corpus or income, stem from Mallinckrodt
v. Nunan,' where trust income was held taxable to an individual who
had broad powers over corpus and income, including the power at any
time to terminate the trust and receive the corpus.
There was no provision of the prior statute which taxed trust in-
come to a person other than the grantor as substantial owner, and the
rules under the prior law were found in the regulations.' The 1954
Code incorporates the rule of the prior regulations into the statute, with
certain changes.
The statute 12 4 states as the general rule that a person other than
the grantor shall be treated as the owner and taxed on the income of
any portion of a trust with respect to which:
(1) he has a power exercisable solely by himself to vest the
corpus or the income in himself; or
(2) he has previously partially released or otherwise modi-
fied such a power and after the release or modification retains
such control as would subject the grantor of a trust to tax as the
owner under the rules applicable to the grantor.
120. § 677(b).
121. Ibid. See text following note 43 supra.
122. 146 F.2d 1 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 871 (1945). See also Spies v.
United States, 180 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1950) ; Emery v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d 728
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 772 (1946). But cf. Funk v. Commissioner, 185
F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1950).
123. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.22(a)-22 (1953); U.S. Treas. Reg. 111,
§29.22(a)-22, as added by T.D. 5488, 1946-1 Cum. BuLL 19 (1946).
124. § 678.
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It is important to observe that in order for the substantial ownership
rule to apply to a person other than the grantor, the prohibited power
must be exercisable by such person alone. Unlike the grantor, such
person will not be treated as the owner where the power is exercisable
only in conjunction with a third person, whether or not having an ad-
verse interest, or where the power is exercisable by the third person
alone.
As an exception to the general rule, the person other than the
grantor is not to be treated as owner because of a power to vest income
in himself, if the grantor is otherwise treated as the owner under the
rules relating to the grantor." The implication is that if a person
other than the grantor has a power to vest corpus in himself, the trust
income is to be taxed to him even though the grantor has a power or
interest which otherwise could cause the income to be taxed to the
grantor. The regulations should clarify this point.
The statute provides further that the general rule shall not apply
to a power which enables such person, in the capacity of trustee or co-
trustee, merely to apply the income of the trust to the support or main-
tenance of a legal dependent, except to the extent that the income is so
applied.12 Although the statute does not so state, it implies that if such
person in his individual capacity and not as a trustee has power to ap-
ply trust income for the support of a legal dependent, the income is
taxable to him. Trust income which is used to discharge a legal obli-
gation of the grantor has been held taxable to the grantor as bene-
ficiary, 2 7 and it has been held that a power in a trustee to apply trust
income to discharge a legal obligation of the grantor is equivalent to
a power to pay the income to the grantor.12 However, there have been
no reported cases where the contention was made that those rules apply
to trust income which is or may be applied to discharge the legal obliga-
tions of someone other than the grantor.
As in the case of the provisions relating to the grantor as owner,
these provisions do not expressly relieve the person other than thd
grantor of tax where he has the power as trustee or co-trustee to apply
corpus for the support of a legal dependent. The statute states, how-
ever, that where such amounts are applied or distributed out of corpus
or income other than that of the taxable year, such amounts are to be
considered distributions of income and taxed to the holder of the power
as a beneficiary of a second tier distribution.
29
125. § 678(b).
126. § 678(c).
127. Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1 (1935) ; Helvering v. Schweitzer, 296 U.S.
551 (1935); Helvering v. Blumenthal, 296 U.S. 552 (1935).
128. Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154 (1942).
129. § 678(c). See text following note 55 supra.
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It is provided further that the general rule taxing income to a
person other than the grantor shall not apply to a power which has
been renounced or disclaimed within a reasonable time after the holder
of the power first became aware of its existence. 8 0 The statute thus
makes the same distinction between a release of a power and a disclaimer
which is made by the estate and gift tax statutes relating to powers of
appointment.'8 '
INCOME IN RESPECT OF DECEDENTS
The provisions relating to income in respect of decedents are
found in Part II of Subchapter J, comprising Sections 691 and 692.
The 1954 Code continues the provisions of the 1939 Code, enacted in
1942,132 but adds provisions dealing with certain situations not covered
by the prior law. As an aid to understanding the new provisions, it
may be helpful to review the general provisions of the prior statute.133
The 1942 statute enacted provisions taxing to a decedent's estate
or beneficiary items of income in respect of a decedent. The purpose
of the statute was to grant relief from prior statutes 184 which required
the inclusion, in the final return of a cash-basis decedent, of all items
of income accrued at death.'- The pre-1942 statute, as construed by
the courts, was not limited to income accrued in a strict accounting.
sense and resulted in some instances in the "bunching up" in a dece-
dent's final return of large amounts of income which would be received
over a period of several years after the decedent's death.'86
Although the 1942 statute was aimed primarily at income accrued
at death, the statute did not define "income in respect of a decedent,"
and the courts have construed the statute to be broad enough to tax to
a decedent's estate or beneficiary all income earned by or attributable to
the decedent during his lifetime whether or not accrued at the time of
his death. For example, it has been held that a voluntary payment of
130. § 678(d).
131. §§2041, 2514. See U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.24(b) (3) (iii) (1942), as
amended, T.D. 5283, 1943 Cum. BULL. 1114; U.S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.2(b) (5) (iii)
(1943), added by T.D. 6077, 1954 INT. REv. Bn.L. No. 30, at 22 (1954).
132. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 126, added by 56 STAT. 831 (1942).
133. See 2 MERTFIs, LAw OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION § 12.100 (Supp.
1944) ; Craven, Taxation of Income of Decedents, 102 U. OF PA. L. REv. 185 (1953);
Drye, The Taxation of a Decedent's Income, 8 TAx L. REv. 201 (1953).
134. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 42, 53 STAT. 24 (1939) (prior to 1942 amend-
ment).
135. SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 373 (1954) ; H.R. REP. No. 2333,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1942) ; SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1942).
136. See Helvering v. Enright, 312 U.S. 636 (1941).
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salary by an employer to the estate of a deceased employee for a period
after death is taxable as income to the estate 137 and that renewal com-
missions received by the estate of a deceased insurance ageni are taxable
as income to the estate. 8s
Items of income in respect of a decedent are taxable in the year in
which received to the decedent's estate or to a legatee or other bene-
ficiary acquiring from the decedent the right to receive such items.'39
If the right to receive an item of income in respect of a decedent is
transferred by the decedent's estate or other person acquiring such
right from the decedent, the fair market value of such right at the time
of the transfer is includible in the income of the estate or other per-
son.140  The item of income is deemed to have been acquired by the
decedent's estate or beneficiary in the same transaction in which it was
acquired by the decedent and to have the same character to the estate
as it would have in the hands of the decedent. 4 ' Certain items of de-
ductions and credits in respect of a decedent are allowed as deductions
and credits in the year of payment to the estate or beneficiary obligated
to make such payment."
Items of income in respect of a decedent are ordinarily subject to
estate tax as well as to income tax. In order to grant partial relief
from double taxation, an income tax deduction is allowed for the federal
estate tax, reduced by the credit for state death taxes, on the net in-A
come in respect of a decedent, that is, the excess of the gross income
over the deductions reflected in the estate tax retur. 14 The amount
of the estate tax is computed at the highest rates on such net income,
that is, it is the difference between the amount of the estate tax with
such income included and the amount of the estate tax with such income
excluded. The estate tax is deductible by the estate or beneficiary pro-
portionately each year in the ratio that the items of gross income in re-
spect of a decedent received by the estate or beneficiary in that year
bear to the total gross income included in the estate tax return.
The changes made by the 1954 Code are discussed below.
137. Bausch's Estate v. Commissioner, 186 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1951).
138. Estate of Thomas F. Remington, 9 T.C. 99 (1947); cf. Estate of Boyd C.
Taylor, 17 T.C. 627 (1951), aff'd per curiam, 200 F.2d 561 (6th Cir. 1952).
139. §691 (a) (1) (formerly Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 126(a) (1), added by 56
STAT. 831 (1942)).
140. § 691 (a) (2) (formerly Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 126 (a) (2), added by 56
STAT. 831 (1942)).
141. §691(a) (3) (formerly Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 126(a) (3), added by 56
STAT. 831 (1942)).
142. § 691(b) (formerly Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 126(b), added by 56 STAT.
832 (1942)).
143. § 691(c) (formerly Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 126(c), added by 56 STAT. 832
(1942)).
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Successive Decedents
The prior statute 144 provided that if a right to receive an item of
income in respect of a decedent was transferred by the decedent's estate
or other person who acquired such right from the decedent, the fair
market value of the right at the time of the transfer was includible in
the gross income of the estate or other person making the transfer. The
regulations under the prior statute "', stated that if a right to receive in-
come in respect of a decedent was disposed of, as by gift or bequest, by
a person acquiring such right from the decedent, the fair market value
of such right must be included in the income of that person. Yet the
Internal Revenue Service ruled that where the widow of a deceased life
insurance agent acquired from her husband the right to receive renewal
commissions and she died before receiving the full amount of the com-
missions, the value of the uncollected portion was not includible in her
final income tax return. 46 Alth6ugh approving the result, the Senate
Finance Committee apparently considered the correctness o'f the ruling
doubtful and thought that under the language of the statute and regu-
lations the death of the widow resulted in a disposition of the right to
receive the commissions and required the inclusion of the value of such
right in the widow's final return.14 7 Therefore, the result of the ruling
was written into the 1954 Code.
The 1954 statute provides that the transmission at death of a right
to receive income in respect of a decedent shall not be deemed a trans-
fer,148 so that the value of the uncollected portion shall not be taxed as
income to the estate of the second or subsequent decedent prior to its
collection. The uncollected portion is taxed to the estate, legatee or
other beneficiary of the second or subsequent decedent only when it is
received,14 and the estate or beneficiary of the second or subsequent
decedent who receives the income is allowed a deduction for the estate
tax imposed on the estate of the decedent from whom the right was ac-
quired or any prior decedent in whose estate such right was taxed. 50
Installment Obligations
A person who sells property on an installment basis is permitted
to report each year as income or capital gain the portion of the install-
144. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 126(a) (2), added by 56 STAT. 831 (1942).
145. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.126(a)-l(f) (1953).
146. See 5 CCH 1952 FED. TAx REP. §6221 (letter dated Dec. 27, 1951).
147. See San. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 373 (1954).
148. § 691(a) (2).
149. §691 (a) (1). See SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 374 (1954).
150. §691 (c) (1).
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ment payment received in that year which the gross profit to be realized
on the sale bears to the total sales contract price."6' The prior law
provided that the death of an individual making an installment sale
would accelerate the unrealized profit reflected in the uncollected install-
ment obligations, 1 2 so that the accelerated profit would be includible in
his final income tax return. However, if a proper bond was filed by
the decedent's representative, realization of the gain was postponed until
the installment obligations were collected, and the gain was taxable to
those entitled to receive the payments."" In cases where a bond was
given, there was no decision or ruling on whether the gain was income
in respect of a decedent, and, therefore, it was not clear under the prior
law whether the person required to report the gain after the decedent's
death was entitled to a deduction for estate tax paid in the decedent's
estate on the gain reflected in the unpaid installment obligations.
The 1954 statute eliminates the requirement of a bond and the re-
quirement that the profit attributable to the uncollected portion be in-
cluded in the decedent's final return 164 and provides that gain on unpaid
installment obligations shall be treated as income in respect of a dece-
dent and taxed to the decedent's estate or beneficiary in years in which
received." 5 The result is that the estate or, beneficiary will be entitled
to a deduction for the estate tax paid on the value of the right to receive
the gain reflected in the unpaid obligations.
Income Distributions
The Tax Court in Estate of Ralph R. Huesman " and Rose J.
Linde 17 held under the prior law that where a decedent's estate re-
ceived an item of income in respect of a decedent and during the tax-
able year distributed such income to a legatee, the distribution was not
deductible by the estate or taxable to the legatee, because it was a
distribution of principal under state law. The soundness of the de-
cisions is open to question. The circuit court affirmed the decision in
the Huesman case 15 on the ground that the legatee to which payment
was made was entitled to receive nothing but principal and was not en-
titled to receive the amount so collected as income. The court refused
151. § 453.
152. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §44(d), 53 STAT. 25 (1939).
153. Ibid.
154. See §453(d) (3).
155. § 691(a) (4). See SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 374 (1954).
156. 16 T.C. 656 (1951), aff'd, 198 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1952).
157. 17 T.C. 584 (1951), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 213 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.
1954).
158. Huesman's Estate v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1952).
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to say that if such an amount of income is distributed to a beneficiary
entitled to receive that amount, the amount is not deductible by the es-
tate and taxable to the beneficiary. In the Linde case, it was the Com-
missioner who contended before the Tax Court that the amount of in-
come was deductible by the estate and taxable to the beneficiary; the
circuit court did not pass on that point, because the Commissioner
conceded the correctness of the Tax Court's decision.'6 9
As has been pointed out,"6 it is immaterial under the 1954 Code
whether or not an amount distributed by an estate is income or principal
under state law. With the exception of a specific bequest or devise, 81
all distributions are treated as distributions of income in an amount not
exceeding the distributable net income of the estate or trust for the
taxable year."= It follows then under the new law that an item of in-
come in respect of a decedent which is received by the estate and dis-
tributed currently will be deductible by the estate and taxable to the
beneficiary." = A proportionate part of the deduction for the estate tax
is allowed by the new law to a beneficiary to whom such income is dis-
tributed.'."
Joint and Survivor Annuities
The prior statute relating to income in respect of a decedent 165
did not refer to a joint and survivor annuity, and it was not clear under
that law whether the survivor annuitant received an income tax deduc-
tion for any part of the estate tax paid on the value of the annuity in
the estate of the deceased annuitant who furnished the consideration.
The Internal Revenue Service ruled that annuities paid from retire-
ment funds to widows or other beneficiaries of deceased employees were
taxable under the provision of the income tax statute relating to an-
nuities'-6 and not under the provision relating to income in respect of
decedents and that no deduction was allowable for estate tax paid on
the survivor's right to receive the taxable portion of the annuity. 6 '
This ruling is questionable because such income, like other items of
income, might well be taxable under both statutory provisions. It was
ruled recently that the beneficiary of a deceased participant under a
159. Commissioner v. Linde, 213 F.2d 1, 7-8 (9th Cir. 1954).
160. See text following note 42 supra.
161. See text following note 64 supra.
162. §§ 661 (a), 662(a).
163. See SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 375 (1954).
164. § 691(c).
165. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 126, added by 56 STAT. 831 (1942).
166. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §22(b) (2), 53 STAT. 10 (1938).
167. See 4 CCH 1947 FED. TAx REP. 6132 (letter dated Oct. 9, 1946).
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qualified employees' pension or profit sharing plan was entitled to de-
duct estate tax on the amount which would have been taxable to the de-
cedent if he had lived.08
The prior statute taxed 3% of the cost of an annuity as income and
excluded the balance of each year's payments until the total of the pay-
ments exceeded the cost of the annuity.'69 The 1954 Code changes
the method of taxing annuities by excluding from income each year an
amount arrived at by dividing the cost of the annuity by the life ex-
pectancy of the annuitant or, in the case of a joint and survivor annuity,
by the combined life expectancy of both annuitants. 7 ' The balance of
each year's payments is includible in income. The amount to be ex-
cluded each year remains the same after the death of the first annuitant.
If the first annuitant furnished all or a part of the consideration
for the annuity, then, except for the portion purchased with funds fur-
nished by the decedent's employer under a qualified pension, stock bonus
or profit sharing plan, all or part of the value at the time of the dece-
dent's death of the survivor's annuity is subject to estate tax in the de-
cedent's estate.17' The 1954 statute relating to income in respect of
a decedent allows to the survivor annuitant as a deduction each year a
proportionate part of the estate tax on the estate of the deceased an-
nuitant based on the portion of the annuity which will be includible in
the survivor's income. No deduction is allowed for the amount of es-
tate tax paid on the excludible portion of the annuity. 2
The procedure to determine the amount of the deduction for the
estate tax on the taxable portion of the annuity is rather complicated.
The value of the annuity for estate tax purposes in the estate of the
deceased annuitant is first determined. From this amount is deducted
the total of the amounts to be excluded from income each year during
the life expectancy of the survivor annuitant, and the difference is the
date-of-death value of the taxable portion of the annuity. The estate
tax on this taxable portion is then computed, and a proportionate part
of such estate tax is allowed each year as a deduction over the life)
expectancy of the survivor, determined as of the date of the decedent's
death."'
For example, assume that A purchases for himself and B a joint
and survivor annuity of $1,000 for which he pays $21,000. Assume
further that the joint expectancy of A and B is 30 years, so that the
168. Rev. Rul. 54-601, I.R.B. 1954-51, 27.
169. Int Rev. Code of 1939, §22(b) (2), 53 STAT. 10 (1938).
170. § 72(b),(c).
171. § 2039.
172. §691(d).
173. See SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 375-76 (1954).
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amount to be excluded from gross income each year throughout the ex-
pectancy of A and B is $21,000/30 or $700. Assume that A dies and
that on his death the annuity has a value of $12,000 and that there re-
main 15 years of the combined expectancy of A and B, so that the total
of the annual exclusions over such period will be 15 x $700 or $10,500.
No deduction will be allowed for the estate tax on the excludible por-
tion of $10,500. However, a deduction will be allowed to B for estate
tax in A's estate on $1,500, the difference between the total value of
$12,000 and the total exclusions of $10,500. If, for example, the high-
est estate tax rate in A's estate is 30%, the deduction for estate tax will
be 30% of $1,500 or $450, which will be spread over the remaining ex-
pectancy of 15 years, so that B will be entitled to a deduction each year
of $30, in addition to the exclusion of $700.
Assume in this example that because a portion of the consideration
for the annuity was furnished by B, only one-half of the value of the
annuity is includible in A's estate. The deduction for estate tax allow-
able to B will be the tax on one-half of $1,500, or $750, which tax will
be 30% of that amount or $225. In that case, B will be entitled to a
deduction of $15 a year over the remaining expectancy of 15 years.
The statute is not clear on one point. The statutory provision
dealing with taxation of joint and survivor annuities 74 indicates that
the exclusion factor is to be based on the combined expectancy of two
or more joint annuitants and that the exclusion factor is to remain the
same after the death of the first annuitant.Y15 However, the provision
dealing with income in respect of decedents 17 indicates. that after the
death of the annuitant who furnished the consideration, the amount to
be excluded each year from the income of a survivor is to be based on
the survivor's remaining expectancy, which may be quite different from
the remaining period of a combined expectancy. This point should be
clarified by the regulations.
Payments to Successor in Interest of a Deceased Partner
Certain payments made by a partnership to a successor in interest
of a deceased partner, in liquidation of the decedent's interest, are
treated by the 1954 Code as income in respect of a decedent.17 7 Pay-
ments which are so treated are (1) payments made as a distributive
share of partnership income where the amount is based on partnership
income and (2) guaranteed payments determined without regard to
174. §72.
175. See SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 175 (1954).
176. § 691(d) (2) (A).
177. §§ 691(e), 736, 753.
ESTATE AND TRUST INCOME TAXATION
income of the partnership for services or use of capital."" However,
the payments so treated as income to such successor in interest do not
include payments made by the partnership in exchange for the deceased
partner's interest in partnership property other than unrealized receiv-
ables and good will, and they do not include payments made for good
will if the partnership agreement provides for a payment for good
will. 179
The treatment as income in respect of a decedent of such payments
to the successor in interest of a deceased partner means that if any
amount is subject to estate tax in the deceased partner's estate on ac-
count of the value of the right to receive such payments, the deceased
partner's estate or other successor in interest will be entitled to an in-
come tax deduction for the estate tax paid on such amount. If the
payments are made merely on account of a contractual right to partic-
ipate in partnership earnings for a period after the decedent's death
and are not made in payment for the deceased partner's interest in part-
nership property, there should be no estate tax on such right.1, 0 How-
ever, a payment on account of a right to income which had accrued at
the time of the decedent's death or a right to receive guaranteed pay-
ments, or on account of the decedent's interest in unrealized receivables
or good will would be subject to estate tax to the extent of the value of
the right or interest for which such payments are made.
Employee's Stock Option
There was no provision of the prior statute which dealt with the
realization of income by the estate or a beneficiary of a deceased em-
ployee on the exercise of an employee's restricted stock option or the
disposition of the stock,'' and the tax consequences in such cases were
uncertain."" The 1954 Code provides that if a restricted stock option
is exercised subsequent to the death of the employee by his estate or
beneficiary, the transaction is to be treated for tax purposes in the same
way as if the exercise had been made by the decedent. 188  If an amount
is required to be included in the gross income of the estate or bene-
ficiary on account of the stock option, a deduction is allowed for the
178. § 736(a).
179. § 736(b). See SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 405-06 (1954).
180. See Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 254 (1935); Charles F. Coates,
7 T.C. 125, 131, 132 (1946); Richard P. Hallowell, 2nd, 39 B.T.A. 50, 55 (1939).
But cf. McClennen v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1942).
181. See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 130A, added by 58 STAT. 48 (1944).
182. See SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 296 (1954) ; Drye, The Taxa-
tion of a Decedent's Income, 8 TAx L. REv. 201, 212 (1953).
183. § 421.
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estate tax attributable to the inclusion in the taxable estate of the de-
ceased employee of the net value for estate tax. purposes of the re-
stricted stock option. For this purpose, the deduction is determined as
if the option acquired by the deceased employee was an item of gross
income in respect of a decedent."'
Taxpayer Dying in Armed Forces
The 1954 Code in Section 692 continues the provision of the prior
statute " which cancels income taxes of a taxpayer dying in the armed
forces. The statute states that if an individual dies during an induction
period in active service as a member of the armed forces of the United
States, and his death occurred while serving in a combat zone or as a
result of wounds, disease or injury incurred while so serving, no income
tax shall be imposed on such individual for the taxable year of death
or any prior year ending on or after the first day of his service after
June 24, 1950. In addition, the statute cancels any unpaid liability of
such individual for income tax for prior taxable years. The provisions
of the prior law were applicable only where the taxpayer died prior to
January 1, 1955. There is no specific termination date under the new
statute.
184. § 421 (d) (6).
185. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 154, added by 65 STAT. 507 (1951), as amended, 67
STAT. 616 (1953).
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